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On Chamberlain's Policy of Appeasement — March 1939

Why do you think Chamberlain's critics suggested that the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was the direct result of his policy of appeasement?

Having gained control of the Sudetenland, the German army went on to invade the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. Had British prime minister Neville Chamberlain refrained from ceding the Sudetenland to the Germans, hoping to appease Hitler in his attempts to maintain peace in Europe, Czechoslovakia might have been able to safeguard her national integrity. According to one public account, it was found that the Czechs were forced to "yield up large proportions of [their] carefully prepared defences" and were required to "admit the German armies deep into the country." These two factors alone, which were forthright consequences of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and the resulting agreement at Munich, enabled an easy and victorious German invasion.

How does Chamberlain defend the policy of appeasement in his speech?

In the same public document, Chamberlain argues that his policy of appeasement was necessary to realize the most immediate goal at the time: the peace of Europe. He also questions other alternatives to his political decision of ceding the Sudetenland, and since there were none, his visits to Germany the year previous were the sole way out to prevent a forceful invasion of Czechoslovakia and other neighbouring countries.

How convincing do you find Chamberlain's defence?

Chamberlain's defence tentatively appeals to the historian's reason, as his primary goal of his policy of appeasement and the resulting Munich Agreement was to maintain peace and serenity in Europe. In this respect, Chamberlain's reasoning cannot be misconstrued. Chamberlain, along with many others, did not expect Hitler to bypass the agreement and proceed to occupy the whole of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain's asking "for what was the alternative" is reasonable, for there was none.

On the contrary, Chamberlain, as prime minister of "Europe's best manhood" should have known the better bit of Hitler and should have realized Hitler's genuine goals: a full-fledged conquest of Europe. Furthermore, the detrimental effects that were to impact Europe were a result of Chamberlain's own serious under-estimation of Hitler's potency. Thus Chamberlain's policy of "curing-the-present", his aim to put an end to just the immediate tensions, his lack of consideration of the long-term effects, and his distorted forethought only served to exacerbate the problem and therefore necessitates him to accept the blame for the fate of Czechoslovakia.